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MARKS. McLEOD 
CAN BELIEF IN GOD BE CONFIRMED? 
A basic thrust behind Alvin Plantinga's position that belief in God is properly 
basic is an analogy between certain non-religious (and presumably justified) 
beliefs such as ' I  see a tree' and theistic beliefs such as 'God made this 
flower'.1 Each kind of belief is justified for a believer, argues Plantinga, when 
she finds herself in a certain set of conditions. Richard Grigg challenges this 
claim by arguing that while the non-religious beliefs are confirmed, beliefs 
about God are not. I wish to explore this challenge, clarify it and suggest that 
on one understanding it is irrelevant and on another it is false. 
Grigg writes: 
Plantinga points out that a belief such as the one that I had breakfast this morning 
is properly basic in certain circumstances, i.e. as long as I have no reason for 
supposing that my memory is defective. But note that we can trust beliefs such as 
(1) ['I see a tree'], (2) ['I had breakfast this morning'], and (3) ['That person is 
angry'] not only because we are unaware of defects in our experiential equipment 
but also because we constantly have outside sources for confirmation of such beliefs. 
Indeed, is it not only through such outside sources that we can become aware of a 
defect in our equipment? For example, when I return home this evening, I will see 
some dirty dishes sitting in my sink, one less egg in my refrigerator than was there 
yesterday, etc. This is not to say that (2) is believed because of evidence. Rather, it 
is a basic belief grounded immediately in my memory. But one of the reasons that 
I can take such memory beliefs as properly basic is that my memory is almost always 
subsequently confirmed by empirical evidence. But this cannot be said for a belief 
about God, e.g. the belief that God created the world (Grigg: 125, 126). 
I will call ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , and ( 3) the ' paradigm ' beliefs. 
Grigg's argument, briefly stated, is that the paradigm beliefs are legit­
imately properly basic because of some type of confirmation they have, 
while belief in God is not similarly confirmed. Since the analogy to which 
Plantinga appeals claims that the paradigm beliefs and beliefs about God 
1 R�ferences are as follows. (Alston) William P. Alston, 'Christian Experience and Christian Belier. 
(Plantmga) Alvin Plantinga, 'Reason and Belief in God'. Both in Faith and Rationaliry: Reason and 
Bel�J in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University Press). 
�Gngg) Richard Grigg, 'Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga', International Journal 
; P�ilosophy of Religion, xiv (1983), 123-7. For the development of the analogy discussed here, see 
a11tmga's essay. 
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have the same epistemological status, the lack of confirmation for beliefs 
about God shows that the analogy fails. 
The nature of the confirmation for which Grigg calls, however, is not 
clear. Some clarificatory terminology and distinctions are in order. At one 
point Grigg seems to call for the confirmation of beliefs as when he suggests 
that ' I  had breakfast this morning' is confirmed by there being dirty 
dishes in the sink. At another point he seems to suggest that it is the reliability 
of the belief-forming practice which stands in need of confirmation - 'my 
memory is almost always subsequently confirmed by empirical evidence ' 
(Grigg: 126). It will be convenient to call the confirmation of a practice's 
reliability the 'validation ' of a practice while reserving the term 'confir­
mation' for the confirmation of the truth of a belief. 
A second clarificatory point is that surely not every properly basic belief 
is confirmed. Hence, confirmation of a given belief is not necessary for its 
proper basicality. Two cases come to mind. First, some beliefs, even when we 
try to confirm them, fail to be confirmed and yet it does not follow that such 
a belief is not properly basic. The memory belief that I took a walk by myself 
in the woods yesterday may not be confirmed because no one else saw me, 
my hiking boots show no evidence of the walk, I didn't bring back any 
evidence of the walk from the woods, etc. So, even though many memory 
beliefs are confirmed, not all are, but such beliefs do not necessarily fail to 
be properly basic. 
The second case deals with the simple fact that many beliefs are not 
confirmed because we have neither the time, the interest, nor any special 
reason to d� so. Generally speaking I do not concern myself with the 
confirmation of my memory beliefs, unless there is some special reason to do 
so. For example, typically I do not worry about whether I ate breakfast this 
morning unless I am being asked by the physician just before she does 
surgery. If my memory seems vague on the topic I might then try to confirm 
or disconfirin my memory belief. But the failure of a given belief to be 
confirmed surely .does not entail that the belief is not properly basic. 
Two morals should be drawn here. First, the concern ought to be not that 
each and every properly basic belief is confirmed but that when, in general, 
one attempts to confirm a certain belief, it is confirmed. There will, of course, 
be some exceptions to the rule. This brings attention to the second moral, viz. 
that attention should be paid to the source of the belief to be confirmed - the 
practice - rather than the belief alone. An important relationship seems 
to hold between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of the 
practice which generates them. For example, it may be that since many 
beliefs generated by a given practice are confirmed, the practice is validated. 
It might then be enough for a defence of Plantinga's theory against the 
confirmation challenge to show that if the practice from which a belief comes 
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is validated as reliable, then any belief generated by the practice, all other 
things being equal, can be legitimately taken to be properly basic. Here we 
find a potential explanation for the fact that we generally trust our beliefs 
even though not every belief can nor should be confirmed. 
Armed with these distinctions and this terminology we can understand 
Grigg to be calling attention to the following dilemma: either (A) a given 
belief-forming practice is validated because beliefs generated by the practice 
are confirmed relative to other beliefs delivered by the practice or (B) no 
belief generated by the practice can be confirmed until (i) the practice 
generating it is independently validated or (ii) the belief itself is confirmed 
independently of the new practice. 
This dilemma is the focus of the remaining sections, beginning with the 
second branch (B). 
II 
Stated :nore rigorously, branch (B) of the dilemma claims that for any belief 
p gener'ated by practice A, confirmation is due either to a belief (or set of 
beliefs) q generated by practice B (where Bis not the same practice as A) or 
to the validation of A which in turn is due to some belief (or set of beliefs) 
q which is generated by some practice B (where again B is not the same 
practice as A). In other words, the confirmation of a belief generated by a 
given practice is independent, in the final analysis, of the practice itself and, 
by extension, independent of beliefs generated by that practice. 
Now if Grigg is suggesting that the paradigm beliefs are confirmed by 
either of these two independent means he simply seems to be mistaken. For 
example, in the case of confirming memory beliefs I will nearly always, if not 
always, utilize other beliefs generated by memory itself. In order to confirm 
my memory belief that I had eggs for breakfast this morning I will have to 
remember how many eggs were in the refrigerator yesterday. The con­
firmation of the belief is not independent of the practice which generates the 
belief in the first place. 
More importantly, however, if this independent confirmation were 
available for the paradigm practices there would be little motivation for 
Plantinga to move beyond classical foundationalism. If we had independent 
confirmation for beliefs which were self-evident or incorrigible or evident to 
the senses then our basic beliefs could serve as the kind of firm foundation 
desired by the classical foundationalist. There would be, in other words, an 
independent check of the truth of basic beliefs. But this check is not available, 
as the abundant examples from the history of scepticism show. Epistemologists 
have failed to meet the sceptic's charge and provide the independent link 
between our beliefs and the world. 
As a means of becoming more clear on the issue under consideration we 
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can explore briefly a suggestion due to William Alston. Some epistemic 
practices are what he calls 'basic practices'. A basic practice, he writes, is 
one that constitutes our basic access to its subject matter. [For example,] we can 
learn about our physical environment only by perceiving it, by receiving reports of 
the perceptions of others, and by carrying out inferences from what we learn in these 
first two ways. We cannot know anything a priori about these matters, nor do we 
have any other sort of experiential access to the physical world (Alston: r r 7). 
The practices which generate the paradigm and theistic beliefs may be just 
such practices. Since we have no other access to the objects about which we 
form the beliefs beside the practices which generate the beliefs, we cannot 
appeal to outside, independent information as a source of confirmation. 
So, just as the only access we have to the physical world is through 
perception, perhaps at the end of the day the only access we have to God is 
through the practice which generates theistic beliefs. The confirmation of 
both types of beliefs will rely on the practices which form them and in turn 
the validation of the practices themselves will rely on the confirmation of the 
beliefs generated by them. Grigg might argue that we could have access to 
those religous beliefs by using a discursive belief-forming practice (natural 
theology) and that this is what should validate the practice of forming 
theistic beliefs. But given the lack of success with natural theology (com­
parable to the lack of success in epistemology with confirming perception's 
deliverances by reasoning from beliefs about sensations (or from sensations 
themselves) to beliefs about the external, physical world), it hardly seems 
likely that we should turn there for validation of the practice or, by exten­
sion, the confirmation of beliefs. 
Whatever is demanded of beliefs about God, one should not demand more 
of them than that demanded of the paradigm beliefs. Confirmation of the 
independent variety of branch (B) is not available for either the paradigm or 
theistic beliefs. Since an independent check is not available, one should 
anticipate a kind of circularity in the confirmation of properly basic beliefs. 
Grigg's challenge collapses into branch (A) of the dilemma. 
III 
One further note of clarification is needed before we consider branch (A). 
Exactly which beliefs are to be confirmed? Grigg suggests that the belief 
'God created the world' lacks the kind of confirmation the paradigm beliefs 
have. Now while one must admit that this appears to be true primafacie, the 
truth of the claim will not, in the final analysis, play the important role Grigg 
attributes to it. The kind of belief to which he calls attention is what we can 
call a 'general belief' and this is the wrong type of belief on which to 
concentrate. Since the intuitive force of his conclusion rests on the nature of 
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the belief he singles out for consideration, his argument will lose much of its 
force once this focus is realigned. 
Rather than concentrating on Grigg's kind of example, Plantinga calls 
attention to beliefs such as 'God created the flower' or 'God is angry with 
my sin ' (see Plan tinga : 80). What kind of beliefs are these? If the analogy 
is followed closely, a picture of properly basic beliefs develops in which the 
beliefs are not general claims such as 'all trees are green' and 'God created 
everything' but specific beliefs generated by specific experiences, e.g. ' I  see 
a tree (here and now)' or ' God created this tree' .1 It is much less clear upon 
considering these examples that they lack confirmation. The intuitive force 
of Grigg's argument begins to wane once his somewhat misleading example 
is recognized as such. 
I V  
What then is the central difficulty standing in the way of confirmation for 
specific beliefs about God? The following example will help us here. Suppose 
I pray requesting of God a new Jaguar. I form the belief that God has 
provided me with a Jaguar. This belief stands in need of confirmation. The 
next morning I find a new Jaguar in my driveway, along with a letter 
containing the pink slip for the Jaguar registered in my name. 
A comparison of the Jaguar and breakfast cases will focus the discussion 
on the right issue. Grigg argues that the belief that I ate breakfast this 
morning is confirmed by the fact that there is one less egg in the refrigerator 
than was there yesterday. In this case I am able to predict that such and such 
a state of affairs will be the case given the truth of the belief to be confirmed. 
'There will be one less egg in the refrigerator' will be true - ceteris 
paribus - if I ate breakfast this morning. But the prediction is possible only 
if it is also true that there are certain regularities in nature such that whenever 
one eats something it disappears from view. Grigg seems to have in mind 
confirmation which can, generally speaking, be done whenever one attempts 
to do so because there are certain true beliefs which link the belief to be 
confirmed to some predictable state of affairs. 
Likewise in the Jaguar example. If there is to be parity between the two 
cases there should be some type of prediction at hand which is possible 
because of the truth of certain linking beliefs I hold. Presumably the linking 
belief in the Jaguar case would be something like ' when ever I ask God for 
something he gives it to me'. The state of affairs which I could thus predict 
would be that in fact I do have a Jaguar registered in my name. This state 
of affairs confirms my belief that God has provided me with a Jaguar. 
1 Plantinga does give the following example of a properly basic belief: 'This vast and intricate universe 
was created by God' (Plantinga: 80). It seems not to be the best example, however, for it breaks the 
��logy between the paradigm beliefs and other beliefs about God. Although one could conceivably 
heve 'I see the world', it is not a belief which describes a literal case of perception. 
Two observations are in order. First, this type of confirmation relies upon 
discursive reasoning which, in the theistic case, amounts to natural theology. 
Let me explain. 
How does one know that the linking belief needed for confirmation is true? 
In the breakfast case the belief ' whenever I eat something it disappears from 
view' appears to be just a generalization from past empfrical experience in 
which every time I have eaten something it has disappeared. In fact, the 
confirmed and confirming beliefs involved in the breakfast case are them­
selves, when taken together, one more instance of confirmation for the 
linking belief or, alternatively, one more bit of inductive data which can be 
used as evidence for concluding that the linking belief is true. The linking 
belief is inferred from properly basic beliefs which describe empirical events 
or states of affairs such as 'eating breakfast' and 'seeing one less egg in the 
refrigerator than was there yesterday'. 
But the Jaguar case is significantly different. There is discursive reasoning 
in the background but while in the breakfast case the discursive reasoning 
begins and ends with claims about empirical objects or events, in the Jaguar 
case the reasoning begins with the presence of a physical object and ends 
with a claim about God. There is in the background of the confirmation an 
appeal to an independent source of information, viz. discursive natural 
theology. But, as already argued, this is ruled out. 
But suppose we reject the use of natural theology as part of the confir­
mation methodology (as we ought, given the argument in section rr) and 
move toward the suggestion given in branch (A) of the dilemma. Here we 
come to the second observation, viz. that even with the admission of cir­
cularity, confirmation for the belief that God has provided this Jaguar for me 
is not forthcoming. I lack the appropriate linking belief, for God does not 
give me whatever I ask for. This begins to raise the suspicion that the 
confirmation Grigg demands of theistic belief will not be forthcoming. 
There are then two central difficulties that any argument for the confir­
mation of theistic beliefs must overcome. First, one must avoid sneaking 
in the use of natural theology as a means of confirmation through the back 
door or provide an account of why this can legitimately be done. Second, one 
must explain the lack of predictive power of the theistic beliefs, arguing that 
it is not a feature necessary for confirmation of theistic beliefs. 
The possibility of using confirmation which relies on natural theology 
seems an unlikely one. The use of discursive reasoning which relies on 
empirical facts to justify the linking belief about God is nothing more than 
an attempt at having independent confirmation for the belief in question. 
Since the motivation for arguing that belief in God can be properly basic is 
that such justification is not available, it would be illegitimate (and quite 
likely unsuccessful) to use it here. Its use cannot be justified, thus it cannot 
be legitimately slipped in through the back door. It must be avoided. 
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Can the prediction problem find a solution through concentrating on 
confirmation of the circular variety mentioned in branch (A) of the 
dilemma? I have suggested that even if we grant a circular approach to 
confirmation, theistic beliefs remain unconfirmed. This claim stands in need 
of further analysis. 
Suppose we consider the belief 
( I ) 'God created this flower' 
as a properly basic belief. If we follow the suggested route of circular 
confirmation this belief would have to be confirmed in (something like) the 
following way. Suppose one takes all properly basic beliefs of the form 'God 
created x' where x is some object in the world. Each would confirm 
(2) 'God created the world.' 
In turn, ( 2) could be used to confirm any belief of the form 'God created 
x' and hence ( I )  would be confirmed. There is no appeal to natural theology 
here, for there is no move from some merely empirical data to a claim about 
God. 
This proposed line of confirmation fails, however. To see why, we first 
need a fuller account of the proposition held when one believes 'God created 
x'. Such an account would go (something like) this: 
(3) 'The flower has the kind of (divine) beauty, intricate design, etc., 
which can only come from God's creation.' 
In other words, there is some feature of the flower which links the flower to 
God's creative touch. (There can be no inference from a merely natural 
feature to God's touch, for that would be natural theology again.) Now 
while (3) entails ( I ) (the former being a fuller account of the latter), (3) is 
not entailed by ( 2), for (3) has greater content that ( 1 ) but ( 2) does not have 
greater content than (3) nor does ( 2) claim the same thing as (3) or ( I ) . 
There must be some linking belief between (2) and ( I ) (captured in part by 
(3)) which indicates which features are linked to God's creative touch. More 
importantly, however, the linking belief must indicate when the confirming 
experience of sensing God's touch will occur or, more precisely, when we will 
recognize the feature which allows us to form the specific belief that God 
created the flower. The linking belief must refer to regularity. 
We can generalize from this and the Jaguar examples to the conclusion 
that there are no linking beliefs which enable us to predict when and in 
what way we will experience the handiwork of God in the revelatory way 
to which Plantinga points. One might even venture to claim that an 
empirical survey would reveal that such linking beliefs are not among the 
beliefs even of the most faithful theistic believers. So long as there is no linking 
belief which allows us to predict when we will have the appropriate con­
firming experience there will be no confirmation of the type for which 
Grigg calls. This then is the central difficulty in providing confirmation for 
theistic beliefs. 
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My conclusion thus far is that the fundamental force behind the confirmation_ 
challenge is that predictive confirmation of theistic beliefs is not available. 
This problem is considered by Alston when he discusses the following 
disanalogies between what he calls 'perceptual practice' (PP) - 'our familiar 
way of objectifying sense experience' - and 'Christian practice' (CP) - 'the 
practice of objectifying certain ranges of experience in terms of Christian 
theology ' (Alston: 109). He writes: 
I believe that many people are inclined to take CP to be discredited by certain ways 
in which it differs from PP, by the lack of certain salient features of PP. These' include 
the following: 
( r) With PP there are standard ways of checking the accuracy of any particular 
perceptual belief. If, by looking at a cup, I form the belief that there is coffee in it, 
I can check this belief for accuracy by smelling or tasting the contents; I can get 
other observers to look at it, smell it, or taste it; I can run chemical tests on it and 
get other people to do so. 
(2) By engaging in PP we can discover regularities in the behavior of objects 
putatively observed, and on this basis we can, to a certain extent, effectively predict 
the course of events (Alston: r 2 r). 
Alston further claims that I is simply a special case of 2. He writes: 
For our standard checking procedures in perceptual practice presuppose that we 
know a good deal about the ways in which things can be expected to behave in the 
physical world. Consider the appeal to other observers. Suppose I think I see a fir 
tree across from my house. What would count as intersubjective corroboration? 
Surely not any report of seeing a fir tree. If someone reports seeing a fir tree in Nepal, 
that will not tend to show that there is a fir tree across from my house. Nor will the 
failure of someone in Nepal, or across town, to see a fir tree have any tendency to 
disconfirm my report. Nor would it disconfirm my report if a blind man or one 
wholly preoccupied with other matters stands just where I was standing and fails to 
see a fir tree. The point is, of course, that only observers that satisfy certain con­
ditions as to location, condition, state of the environment (enough light), and so on 
can qualify as either confirming or disconfirming JTIY report. And how do we know 
what conditions to specify? We do it in the light of presumed regularities in the 
interaction of physical objects and sentient subjects. Persons in certain circum­
stances, and only in those circumstances, will count as possible confirmers or dis­
confirmers of my claim, because, given what we know about the way things go in 
the psychophysical world, it is only persons in such circumstances that could be 
expected to see a fir tree if there is one there .... Since r holds of a practice only if 
2 holds, one can concentrate on the latter (Alston: r 22). 
One point of Alston's disanalogy, i.e. that CP lacks features I and 2 whi�e 
PP does not, is that the perceptual world is regular and on the basis of this 
regularity we can confirm or disconfirm our beliefs. For example, we can 
confirm the belief ' I  ate breakfast this morning' because we hold the 
(accurate) beliefs that things do not pop randomly in and out of existence, 
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that things will be more or less as I left them unless someone has disturbed 
them, and that whenever I eat something it disappears from view. In short, 
the physical universe does not radically change without some reason or 
cause. 
Grigg's challenge follows a similar pattern. We do not find the regularities 
in religious experience and confirmation which we find in perceptual or 
memory experience. Theistic beliefs are not confirmed, and the practice 
by which theistic beliefs are formed is not validated, simply because the 
attempts at validation and confirmation depend on the regularity of the 
objects which the beliefs are purportedly about. They lack the possibility of 
what we can call procedurally predictive confirmation. God does not provide 
regular, consistent behaviour in which we can find patterns by which we can 
predict how or when he will reveal himself or truths about his relationship 
to the world. 
Alston admits that r and 2 really are disanalogies between PP and CP but 
claims they are irrelevant, for while the features discussed in r and 2 tend to 
show that PP is reliable, they are not necessary features of reliability. In fact, 
if features r and 2 were true of CP they would tend to show CP unreliable, 
given other features of CP. Alston writes: 
The reality CP claims to put us in touch with is conceived to be vastly different from 
the physical environment. Why should not the sorts of procedures required to put 
us in effective cognitive touch with this reality be equally different? Why suppose 
that the distinctive features of PP set an appropriate standard for the cognitive 
approach to God (Alston: l 28)? 
He continues by describing a possible state of affairs in which CP is quite 
trustworthy even though lacking features r and 2. He writes: 
Suppose, then, that (A) God is too different from created beings, too 'wholly other,' 
for us to be able to grasp any regularities in His behavior. Suppose further that (B) 
for the same reasons we can only attain the faintest, sketchiest, and most insecure grasp of 
what God is like. Finally, suppose that (C) God has decreed that a human being will 
be aware of His presence in any clear and unmistakable fashion only when special 
and difficult conditions are satisfied. If all this is the case, then it is the reverse of 
surprising the CP should lack [1 and 2], even if it does involve a genuine experience 
of God. It would lack l-2 because of (A) . . .. Now it is compatible with (A)-(C) that 
(D) religious experience should, in general, constitute a genuine awareness of the 
divine; that (E) although any particular articulation of such an experience might 
be mis.taken to a greater or lesser extent, indeed even though all such articulations 
might miss the mark to some extent, still such judgments will, for the most part, 
contain some measure of truth; and that (F) God's designs contain provision for the 
co�r�ction and refinement, for increasing accuracy of the beliefs derived from 
rehg1ous experience. If something like (A)-(F) is the case, then CP is trustworthy 
even though it lacks features [ 1  and 2] (Alston: 129). 
I? other words, the epistemic practice of forming beliefs about God is 
different in an important way from the epistemic practice in which we form 
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beliefs about perceptual objects. The object of the former lacks the regularity 
of the object of the latter. While the dishes in the sink will remain in the sink 
and hence we can perceive them - ceteris paribus - when we try to, God 
does not necessarily act in this static fashion. 
But there may be an explanation for this lack of regularity, viz. God's 
revelation of himself is not confined by the regularities of the natural order. 
The lack of regularity in our experience of God, then, is no reason to reject 
the reliability of the practice. In fact, Alston claims, if the features listed 
above are true of God and the epistemic contexts surrounding belief in God, 
then the features not only show that r and 2 are not necessary for the 
trustworthiness of the practice of forming theistic beliefs. The featurns also 
show that if we did discover great regularity in God's dealings with us we 
would have a reason to distrust the deliverances of the practice. 
Thus, insofar as Grigg shares the point of view expressed by Alston's 
disanalogies Alston's strategy to free CP of the charges dealing with lack of 
confirmation will also be successful against Grigg's difficulty with theistic 
beliefs and the practice by which they are formed. The Alstonian reply is, 
simply stated, that the charge is irrelevant. So it should be with Grigg's 
charge. We can go ahead and admit that there is the disanalogy Grigg 
suggests between the paradigm practices and the theistic practice, viz. that 
the paradigm practices have objects which are regular in their relation to the 
knower while the theistic practice does not. But we can also claim that this 
is as it should be and the disanalogy is irrelevant. 
Of course nothing in Alston's claims entails that other kinds of confir­
mation are Impossible and here I wish tentatively to move beyond his 
suggestions. While Alston and Grigg are correct in their assessments of the 
possibility of procedurally predictive confirmation for theistic beliefs, there 
seems to be a type of non-predictive confirmation which may be available to 
some theistic believers for a certain kind of theistic belief, viz. general theistic 
beliefs. 
Suppose I hold the belief that God created the world. If I also form (by 
happenstance or God's grace which is not due to the regularity of God's 
activity) the belief that God created the flower then in some sense 'God 
created the world' would be confirmed. How can this be, given the argument 
above against procedurally predictive confirmation? Is it still the case that 
( 2) 'God created the world', while seeming to entail ( r ) 'God created the 
flower' does not, for ( r ) is linked to (2) by (3) 'the (divine) beauty of the 
flower can only be explained by God's creation' and (2) does not entail (3)? 
This argument, I suggest, does not hold against non-predictive confirmation, 
for neither (3) nor any claim making reference to regular features of the 
object neither need be the link between (2) and ( r ) . This is the point of 
Alston's possible state of affairs in which God does not act predictably and 
yet is trustworthy. (3) is necessary for predictive confirmation, for it provides 
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for the necessary regularity - the prediction that I will form the belief that 
God created the flower. It seems not to be necessary for non-predictive 
confirmation, however, for no such linking regularity is necessary. If I do 
form (I), it need not be linked to regular features of the flower. (I) need 
not be more fully describ(ld as (3) in order to allow for non-predictive 
confirmation. All that would be needed for such a non-predictive con­
firmation is an understanding of (2) which runs something like 
(4) 'God created everything.' 
If ' God created everything' is true, then it surely entails 'God created the 
flower'. But we need make no predictions of when or how we will form the 
specific belief which would confirm (2) or (4) if we do form it. 
A non-theistic example can help. It is widely believed that there are no 
unicorns. Nevertheless, suppose it is also widely believed - it shows up in all 
the stories about unicorns - that all unicorns eat eucalyptus leaves. Now 
there is no reason to expect confirmation of the belief that all unicorns eat 
eucalyptus leaves, for there are no unicorns, or so it is believed. Suppose, 
however, one discovers one day a unicorn in one's backyard eating euca­
lyptus leaves. Surely this would confirm, even if weakly, the belief that all 
unicorns eat eucalyptus leaves. One would never have predicted such con­
firmation but upon receiving it, it would have at least some prima facie 
plausibility as confirmation. If we add to the story that unicorns, like God, 
are somewhat circumspect in their self-revelations to humankind, only 
showing their faces when they wish, the case doesn't change. Some con­
firmation would be provided. Non-predictive confirmation of general beliefs 
seems at least plausible. 
Of course, even if all this is true I may never form the specific belief that 
God created the flower nor any other specific theistic belief. Nevertheless, if 
I do there seems to be no reason why I shouldn't take it to confirm the 
general belief. For all of this, however, the prima Jacie confirmation which 
might be provided may be outweighed by other considerations. There may 
be some confirmation that God created the world but there may also be 
disconfirmation, such as is provided by the presence of evil. This seems to the 
point behind Basil Mitchell's parable about the Stranger and the partisan. 
Be that as it may, however, another question needs asking. Can specific 
theistic beliefs be confirmed in a similar manner? The answer here is much 
less clear. I have suggested that beliefs of the form 'God created x' may non­
�redictively confirm 'God created the world' so long as no linking regularity 
is required. But for the specific belief ' God created the tree' to be confirmed, 
it must be confirmed by the general belief ' God created everything'. There 
must either be some link up between the confirmed belief and some other 
specific theistic belief via the general belief or the general belief itself must 
ronfirm. For example, either some belief of the form 'God created x ' 
ronfirms 'God created everything' which in turn confirms 'God created the 
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flower' or one is left simply with the general belief ' God created everything' 
confirming the specific belief ' God created the flower'. Now while we may 
be able to get the specific belief confirming the more general belief, to get the 
general belief confirming the specific is questionable. Just as it seems some­
what odd to suggest that 'all swans are white' confirms 'this swan is white', 
it seems somewhat odd to say that 'God created everything' confirms 'God 
created this tree'. In confirmations of general by specific beliefs there is a 
possible (deductive) inference from the general to the specific. This is not 
true with confirmations of specific by general beliefs. The specific belief ' God 
created the flower' clearly does not entail 'God created everything'. 
To return to Grigg's original charge, then, we might suggest that he did 
concentrate on the appropriate belief, the general one. But now there seems 
to be a somewhat plausible understanding of how such a belief might be non­
predictively confirmed and it is the specific beliefs which lack this somewhat 
strange and very weak kind of confirmation. 
Could we ever validate theistic practice? In other words, if I had many 
experiences in which theistic beliefs were formed could I move from the non­
predictive confirmation of individual beliefs to the validation of the practice? 
The answer to this question brings us to some final comments on the 
relationship between validation and the two types of confirmation. It was 
earlier suggested that perhaps when one confirms a sufficient number of 
beliefs delivered from a given practice, the practice is then validated. It 
seems clear enough that what connects the confirming instances and the vali­
dation of the practice is an inductive argument which relies on the regularity 
of the objects about which the beliefs are formed. Induction, resting as it does 
on our trust in the regularity of nature, provides grounds for the move from 
confirming instances to validation only if the objects about which the beliefs 
are formed are regular. If this is correct, then insofar as non-procedural, non­
predictive confirmation does not rest on regularity, the inductive inference 
will not be possible. We could never have validation of the theistic practice. 
This aligns well with Alston's claim that if we discovered that God was 
dealing with us in a predictable fashion, we would have evidence that the 
theistic practice is unreliable. To expect validation of the practice is to 
expect too much. We will have to be satisfied with non-predictive, non­
procedural confirmation of individual beliefs or perhaps, for most of us, no 
confirmation whatsoever. 
Thus, the requirement that theistic beliefs be confirmed (or that the 
practice leading to such beliefs be validated) in the sense that confirmation 
(or validation) requires predictive regularity is overly strong. The demand 
assumes that regularity of the object of belief is a necessary feature for 
confirmation of belief. In turn, this assumes that rational beliefs can only be 
formed about objects for which regular, predictive confirmation is possible. 
But what is necessary for rationality is not regularity but trustworthiness or 
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reliability. Alston provides an account of how a practice can be reliable 
without having a regular object behind it. I have provided an extension of 
his account, suggesting how confirmation of some beliefs about non-regular 
objects may occur. Of course, whether a given belief about a non-regular 
object is confirmed is an empirical question to be answered by whether or 
not one has the appropriate experiences. 
Grigg's challenge is either irrelevant or false. It is irrelevant if it rests on 
the claim that the object about which rational beliefs are formed must be 
regular, for regularity is not a necessary condition for confirmation nor for 
rationality. It is false if Grigg claims that no confirmation of any kind is even 
possibly available for beliefs about non-regular objects. The non-regularity 
merely entails a non-regular, non�predictive type of confirmation, if any at 
all. Hence, so far as this challenge is concerned, beliefs about God can be 
rational. 
VI 
The results of the essay can be stated in more positive terms. The confir­
mation of a rational belief is internal to a set of beliefs, the practice which 
forms that set, and, for beliefs dealing with regular objects, a set of back­
ground linking beliefs. Insofar as a person follows a certain kind of belief­
forming practice and forms a mutually cohering set of beliefs by that practice, 
the deliverances of the practice may be individually confirmed (when pos­
sible) and (when the linking beliefs are in place) the practices themselves 
validated. But there is a certain kind of circularity inherent in any kind of 
confirmation both of the paradigm beliefs and, if theistic beliefs are con­
firmed non-predictively, theistic beliefs. 
Theistic beliefs, of course, are not beliefs about regular objects and not 
everyone has a disposition to form theistic beliefs. Nevertheless, for those who 
do have that disposition, its deliverances can be confirmed when and if one 
has the right kind of experiences - perhaps if God is particularly gracious to 
you. Even if one is not given that special grace, however, one's theistic beliefs 
do have epistemic parity with beliefs delivered from dispositions we all share, 
at least so far as predictive confirmation is concerned, for predictive con­
firmation is irrelevant to theistic belief. The confirmation challenge fails. 
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